Gullshan Desk: The brief but intense showdown between Iran and Israel earlier this year served as a reminder that the underlying animosity in the Middle East never really goes away. Iran intended to portray strength and resolve by launching a barrage of missiles and drones in retaliation for Israeli strikes against its military equipment and top commanders. It did, but only in part, because it also exposed the shortcomings of Tehran’s existing military strategy, which relies on technology, daring, and proxies rather than traditional military might. The majority of the incoming fire was intercepted by Israel’s defenses, which were strengthened by regional and American cooperation. It was a period of deflation and forced reflection for Iran’s leadership, which feeds off stories of resistance and deterrence.
But Iran has hardly been repressed for very long. Its approach has always had a cyclical rhythm: a period of tactical recalibration, a pause to absorb the blow, and a cautious, deliberate return to pressure through its network of proxies. Beneath the seeming constraint is a dictatorship adept at modifying its strategies without compromising its fundamental goal of continuing to be a key player in the Middle East, able to unnerve enemies and influence events well beyond its boundaries.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its special Quds Force are at the center of this concept. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, Syria’s strategic corridors, and the Houthis in Yemen are just a few of the quasi-state players that make up what Tehran refers to as the “axis of resistance.” Earlier, these organizations provided Iran with power without accountability, reach without exposure, and the capacity to bleed its enemies without running the risk of direct conflict. This tactic is still made possible by the missile and drone programs, which provide equal parts intimidation and accuracy. Iran uses proxies, missiles, and psychological warfare instead than mechanized divisions or fleets of planes.
However, the recent battle caused the Iranian elite to lose faith in itself. Israel’s multi-layered air defenses and Western backing seemed to diminish the IRGC’s much-heralded missile capabilities. The Iranian people saw a display of weakness instead of the language of triumph and supernatural protection they were used to. That was disturbing for the ecclesiastical regime, which is based on both coercive power and doctrine. However, Iran rarely learns defeatism from such setbacks. It emphasizes healing more than defeatism.
A calibrated reassertion, or the subtle push to proxies to reestablish deterrence without inciting complete reprisal, is probably going to be the first step in Iran’s comeback. Hezbollah’s provocations on Israel’s northern border and the Houthi strikes in the Red Sea are only two examples of how Tehran has already indicated this. The next step will be to strengthen alliances that improve technology and legitimacy: Iran will receive strategic cover and battlefield validation, while Russia will receive affordable, dependable weaponry. As Arab states move toward accommodation, the ideological drive finally arrives: regaining control of the anti-Israel narrative. Iran now aims to reclaim that role, just as Egypt did when it withdrew following the killing of Anwar Sadat in 1981.
Iran’s consistent nuclear development serves as the backdrop for all of this. Iran currently has uranium that is up to 60% enriched, which is dangerously close to weapons-grade, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amount of time required to create enough fissile material for a bomb has significantly decreased. Iran had amassed almost 400 kg of uranium refined to 60% purity as of mid-May 2025, according to the IAEA’s own verification assessment. This amount put Iran dangerously near to weapons-grade material.
However, the IAEA and independent analysts observed significant physical damage to sensitive centrifuge and conversion equipment after the US strikes on the Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan complexes in late June 2025; estimates of how much this has delayed Iran’s nuclear program vary, ranging from a few months to as much as two years in full-scale enrichment capability. This in no way lessens Iran’s “intransigence” to continue to be the principal force challenging US-Israeli hegemony in the Middle East.
Relying on intelligence assurance and Israel’s demonstrated ability to attack or disrupt, Washington and Jerusalem now seem less concerned. The idea that Iran’s nuclear aspirations are controllable has been fostered by years of covert assault. It could be dangerous to be complacent. Tehran uses ambiguity to keep its opponents constantly unsure of its intentions, treating its program as the ultimate insurance.
Iran looks eastward to its long border with Pakistan and Afghanistan, a volatile triangle where instability jeopardizes its own security and trade, beyond the major theater of the Middle East. Tehran, which favors peace with the Taliban over conflict, is concerned about the current fighting between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It aims to maintain open land connections between Central Asia and India through Iranian territory while preventing terrorist safe havens close to its border. Iran also has a diplomatic niche to exert influence without getting involved because of the unrest between Islamabad and Kabul.
Chabahar has become Iran’s strategic lifeline in this context. Its promise has been resurrected by India’s decision to operationalize a 10-year arrangement to manage a portion of the port. Chabahar has reappeared as Iran’s strategic outlet in this context. India’s IPGL signed a 10-year contract on May 13, 2024, to build and run the Shahid Beheshti terminal. In late October 2025, Washington gave a six-month waiver, enabling Indian activities to continue, in response to a warning from the US.
It gives India access to Afghanistan and other places. Chabahar continues to be Iran’s key to using geography as leverage despite ongoing sanctions and finance delays. A frontal conflict with Israel is unlikely as Iran regains equilibrium, but cyberattacks, drones, and proxies will continue the shadow war. Iran’s ideology sustains the struggle in various forms, while Israel’s advantage guarantees control. Iran is at a classic crossroads, neither overwhelmed nor in control. Sanctions hurt, and a restless, assertive, and connected Generation Z questions the status quo. If the unrest intensifies, what rocked Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan in 2024 can very well reverberate in Iran. The regime understands that patience is power, but in order to survive, it must temper conservatism with modest adjustments.
It cannot ignore internal pressures, but it will continue its grey-zone warfare, avoiding direct confrontation while making its enemies uncomfortable. Its hopes for an Islamic world will also endure, particularly in light of Saudi Arabia’s ideological dilution.
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